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LITIGATING CIVIL RIGHTS CASES TO 
REFORM RACIALLY BIASED CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PRACTICES 
David Rudovsky* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The roadblocks to reform of racially biased and other unfair 
and unconstitutional practices and policies in the criminal justice 
system that have emerged in the era following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp are daunting. The Supreme Court has 
placed significant obstacles to the pursuit of racial justice and 
equality in the criminal justice system.1 These decisions have 
operated on two levels. First, as a procedural matter, the decisions 
have made it very difficult and, in some cases, impossible to obtain 
judicial review of challenged practices.2 Substantive constitutional 
 
 * Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; Founding 
Partner, Kairys, Rudovsky, Epstein & Messing, LLP, Philadelphia. 
1. These obstacles were demonstrated clearly in the presentations at the 
symposium entitled “Pursuing Racial Fairness in the Administration of Justice: 
Twenty Years After McCleskey v. Kemp,” held by the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund and Columbia Law School on Mar. 2–3, 2007. See, e.g., United 
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (holding that for the defendant to 
be entitled to discovery on a claim that he was singled out for prosecution on the 
basis of race, he must make a threshold showing that the government declined to 
prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 291, 306 (1987) (finding that statistical proof of systematic racial 
disparities in the administration of the death penalty implicates neither the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment). 
2. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983) 
(holding that to establish an actual controversy to satisfy standing, Lyons would 
have to show either that all police officers choked citizens or that the city 
authorized officers to act in such a manner). 
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provisions have been diluted or otherwise interpreted in a manner 
that has weakened protection of suspects and defendants,3 expanded 
judicial “door closing” doctrine,4 and limited remedial measures.5 
Second, the Supreme Court’s decisions have established substantive 
constitutional standards that fail to address racial bias and other 
documented unfair practices in the criminal justice system. Congress 
has limited remedies as well.6 Moreover, the “politics of crime,” which 
 
3. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (holding that 
failure to read a suspect Miranda warnings does not require suppression of 
unwarned but voluntary statements); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 
(1991) (holding that police may search a container located within a car even 
without probable cause to search the vehicle as a whole); California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (“The police may search an automobile and the 
containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or 
evidence is contained.”). 
4. I use this term to describe the process by which access to the courts has 
been curtailed by court rulings, or legislation that strips the courts of the power 
to review certain practices or policies, or that limits the remedies that may be 
considered for proven violations; and by doctrinal developments such as 
limitations on standing, immunities, exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and 
federalism principles. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 880–938 (4th 
ed. 2003); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights 
and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1199 (2005) (discussing how 
extensions of doctrines such as qualified immunity and the Eleventh 
Amendment’s sovereign immunity, in addition to limitations imposed by 
legislation, create a system where only egregious violations of rights may be 
subject to judicial remedial action). 
5. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2170 (2006) (holding that 
a violation of the “knock and announce” rule does not require the suppression of 
evidence found during the search); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921–22, 
926 (1984) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not 
bar the use of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a 
search warrant issued by a magistrate and later found invalid); City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s grant 
of injunctive relief for failure to state a case or controversy because plaintiff failed 
to establish the likelihood that a police officer would choke him again or proof of a 
pattern of police officers choking citizens they encounter); Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (finding no exception to the general rule of qualified 
immunity from civil liability in cases involving allegedly unlawful warrantless 
searches of innocent third parties’ homes for fugitives); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. 
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (holding that a plaintiff may recover damages for 
injuries sustained when police stopped her car only if she proves the municipality 
deliberately acted as a principal force behind the injury). 
6. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C. (2006)); Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, Pub. 
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encourages elected officials to expand the reach and the sanctions of 
criminal law, leads to regressive and racially biased practices across 
the system.7 
McCleskey v. Kemp and United States v. Armstrong placed 
almost insurmountable barriers to race-based and other challenges to 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial decision making (particularly in 
the sentencing area).8 In McCleskey, the Court rejected an Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the Georgia death penalty 
system that was based on a comprehensive statistical study by 
Professor David C. Baldus.9 The study found that among all of the 
factors that might influence a jury to impose the death penalty, the 
race of the victim was the central factor.10 The study considered 230 
variables that could affect the sentencing decision and showed that 
where the victim was white, the odds were 4.3 times higher that the 
defendant would be sentenced to death.11 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Baldus study showed only 
a “correlation” between the victim’s race and the death penalty 
sentence.12 The Court was simply unwilling to recognize the degree to 
which race influenced jurors in capital cases. Justice Powell asserted 
that accepting the argument that race played a significant role in the 
imposition of the death penalty would call into “serious question the 
principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”13 Thus, 
the Court accepted discrimination in the most serious decision-
making aspect of the criminal justice system; in the words of Justice 
Brennan, the Court’s concern about the implications of the statistics 
was a “fear of too much justice.”14 
 
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 11, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 18 U.S.C. § 3626; Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting 
Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal 
Cases, 41 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 339, 339 (2006); David Cole, No Equal Justice 6 
(1999). 
8. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); United States v. Armstrong, 
517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
9. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287. 
10. Id. at 286–87. 
11. Id. at 287. 
12. Id. at 308. 
13. Id. at 314–15. 
14. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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The Court took a similar hands-off approach in Armstrong, 
where it reversed a ruling that would have permitted discovery in 
support of a motion to dismiss federal crack cocaine prosecutions 
against African-American defendants on grounds of racially selective 
prosecution.15 The defendants sought to prove discriminatory intent 
by showing a racially disparate pattern of crack cocaine 
prosecutions.16 They supported this allegation with evidence that all 
twenty-four prosecutions in a single year for crack cocaine were of 
African-American defendants, and that there was equal abuse by 
race of crack cocaine.17 The Court denied discovery because the 
defendants “failed to satisfy the threshold showing . . . that the 
Government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of 
other races.”18 Yet such proof would only be available through the 
discovery process. The Court ruled that prosecutors were entitled to a 
presumption of proper performance.19 Ironically, the Court relied on a 
statistical study of drug-related convictions to justify racially 
disproportionate prosecutions, even though this study was far less 
comprehensive than the Baldus study rejected in McCleskey.20 
Notwithstanding these developments, and the prospects for 
an equally conservative Roberts Court,21 there have been some 
successful systemic challenges to racially biased criminal justice 
practices. The models that have been developed in this litigation may 
hold some promise for future action. As I will develop below, while 
McCleskey and Armstrong pose serious obstacles to racial profiling 
challenges, they have not fully precluded such litigation in the 
criminal justice system. In particular, litigation regarding police 
 
15. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 471 (1996). 
16. Id. at 459–60. 
17. Id. at 459. 
18. Id. at 458. 
19. Id. at 464. 
20. Id. at 469. 
21. In the 2006–07 Term of the Supreme Court, a new conservative 
majority of five justices has continued the process of limiting constitutional rights 
and closing the door to persons complaining of constitutional injuries. See, e.g., 
Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007) (ruling that the district court’s 
erroneous statement as to time limits for criminal appeal does not extend the 
statutory time for filing an appeal); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 
127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge executive 
branch violations of the Establishment Clause); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007) (finding local school 
districts’ voluntary integration program to be unconstitutional). 
RUDOVSKY FINAL 2/17/2008   
2007] LITIGATING TO REFORM BIASED JUSTICE 101 
practices, and specifically those practices that affect “point of entry” 
decisions for the criminal justice system, has seen some success. In 
this paper, I will focus on the theoretical and practical strategies that 
have informed this litigation. I will then examine how the best of 
these strategies may be used in the future. Finally, I will describe the 
“innocence” movement, which has created a new set of reform 
dynamics and legal doctrine in the criminal justice system. 
II. RACE, POLICING, AND THE MASS INCARCERATION OF AFRICAN 
AMERICANS 
The problem of racial discrimination in the criminal justice 
system is stark and seemingly impervious to change. Young African-
American men bear the brunt of the system’s injustices during a 
period in which the nation has moved to a process of mass 
incarceration. From initial contacts with police, including stops, 
detentions, searches, and arrests, through prosecution at trial, and 
finally, at the sentencing phase, African Americans suffer from 
severe disproportional representation.22 In virtually every category of 
policing, prosecution, and sentencing, statistical studies demonstrate 
that the disproportionate number of African Americans is explained 
only in part by differences in criminal conduct. With challenges to 
prosecutorial discretion in charging and plea bargaining almost off 
limits,23 and with racial disparities in sentencing shielded by 
inflexible legal doctrine, litigation efforts challenging such disparate 
 
22. See Human Rights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial 
Disparities in the War on Drugs (2000) (noting that aggressive law enforcement 
strategies aimed at curbing drug use have disproportionately affected African 
Americans); Neil J. Smelser et al., America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their 
Consequences (2001) (discussing discrimination on the part of law enforcement 
officials and racial disparities in arrest and incarceration rates); Marc Mauer & 
Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration by Race and Ethnicity 
(Sentencing Project, July 2007), available at http://sentencingproject.org/admin/ 
Documents/publications/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf (noting that 
African Americans are incarcerated at nearly six times the rate of whites); Marc 
Mauer, Race to Incarcerate 135 (2d ed. 1999) (describing persistence of racial 
disparities in the criminal justice system and incarceration rates). 
23. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1978) (reaffirming 
the prosecutor’s complete discretion, and holding that even though his threat to 
reindict the accused on a more serious offense may deter the accused from 
exercising his legal rights, due process has not been violated as long as he is free 
to accept or reject the prosecution’s plea bargain). 
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treatment should focus on individuals’ point of entry into the legal 
system. 
Racial discrimination in policing is often manifested in the 
use of racial profiling in common police practices such as car and 
pedestrian stops, detentions, and searches. Though legal challenges 
to these practices are difficult, they are not foreclosed by Supreme 
Court cases rejecting challenges to racial bias in the areas of 
sentencing and prosecutorial discretion. Cases challenging these 
practices have documented the extent of the problem. For example, 
in State v. Soto, one of the first comprehensive challenges to these 
practices on the New Jersey Turnpike, the court found that stops and 
searches on the Turnpike were disproportionately based on race.24 
Relying on traffic and violator surveys, the court determined that 
approximately 14% of all drivers on the Turnpike were black, that 
virtually all drivers violated the traffic laws (in particular for 
speeding), and that blacks and whites violated traffic laws at almost 
exactly the same rate.25 Yet the court found that 46.2% of stops were 
of black motorists, representing a statistically significant disparity of 
16.35 standard deviations.26 Further, the court found that while 
radar stops made by the Radar Unit were relatively consistent with 
the percentage of black violators, discretionary stops made by the 
Patrol Unit, which is involved in drug interdiction, resulted in double 
the percentage of blacks stopped.27 Of all stops resulting in the 
issuance of a traffic citation, 63% involved cars with a black driver or 
passenger.28 
A study conducted by the Attorney General of New Jersey 
confirmed and expanded upon these findings.29 The Attorney General 
determined that searches of cars on the Turnpike were even more 
racially disparate than the initial stops: 77.2% of all “consent” 
 
24. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 360 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (noting 
that the statistical disparities between African-American and white motorists 
stopped for traffic offenses were “stark”). 
25. Id. at 352–53. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 354. 
28. Id. at 356. 
29. Peter Verniero, Attorney General of New Jersey, Interim Report of the 
State Police Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial Profiling (Apr. 20, 
1999), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf. 
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searches were of minorities and blacks.30 The Attorney General 
concluded that the use of arrest statistics could not justify racially 
disparate stops and searches, as those arrests were the product of 
racially discriminatory law enforcement practices.31 
Statistical studies conducted of car and pedestrian stops in 
Philadelphia also demonstrate patterns of racial profiling and stops 
without cause.32 Plaintiffs’ counsel conducted several studies 
pursuant to a Settlement Agreement in a class action lawsuit against 
the Philadelphia Police Department that was filed in the wake of a 
federal criminal investigation that uncovered systemic corruption 
and misconduct in narcotics enforcement. In 1997, the first study 
considered stops of pedestrians and cars for selected periods and for 
selected police districts in Philadelphia.33 For one week in March and 
one week in October 1997, four police districts in the city recorded in 
a computer database every police-reported stop of a car or a 
pedestrian.34 The data were analyzed to determine whether there 
were racial patterns of enforcement and whether police were 
exercising their stop and frisk power with sufficient cause or 
suspicion.35 The findings raised serious questions concerning racial 
profiling and suspicionless stops and frisks. For example, in the 
Eighteenth District, where African Americans constituted 70.3% of 
the population, for all pedestrian stops reported by the police for two 
different one-week periods in 1997, African Americans were 93% of 
those stopped; whites constituted 4.7% of the stops.36 Of the 214 stops 
 
30. Id. at 26–28. Seizures of contraband on the Turnpike were made at a 
rate of 10.5% from white drivers and 13.7% from African-American drivers. Id. at 
28. 
31. Id. at 67–68. 
32. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Monitoring Report, Pedestrian and Car Stop Audit at 
1–2, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-CV-6045 (E.D. Pa. July 1998) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Fourth Philadelphia Report]; Plaintiffs’ Fifth 
Monitoring Report, Pedestrian and Car Stop Audit at 1, NAACP v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 96-CV-6045 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2000) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Fifth Philadelphia Report]. 
33. Fourth Philadelphia Report, supra note 32, at 1. It should be noted that 
there is even less reliable information made available by police departments 
concerning racial demographics and “cause” for pedestrian stops and frisks than 
for car stops and searches. Many departments require reports only when an 
arrest occurs and no department to my knowledge maintains a computer data 
base of this information. 
34. Id. at 1–4. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 21–22, 26–27. 
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of African-American pedestrians during these periods, 135 were 
conducted without a legally sufficient written explanation.37 
In the Eighth Police District of Philadelphia, where the 
population was 91.2% white and 6.5% African-American, African 
Americans constituted 26.8% of all pedestrians stopped.38 Moreover, 
in this district, while a sufficient reason was provided by the police 
for approximately 40% of all whites stopped, only 15% of African 
Americans were stopped with properly stated cause.39 In comparing 
the stops of African Americans in largely African-American police 
districts to stops made in largely white districts, the statistical data 
showed hugely disproportionate stops by race in the white areas of 
the City, while stops in African-American areas were roughly 
proportionate to the population in those areas.40 In some areas, 
African Americans were stopped over ten times more than one would 
expect from the racial composition of the residential population.41 
In 1999, a second study recorded the number of car and 
pedestrian stops made in predominantly white police districts in 
Philadelphia during a one-week period in July. During that week, the 
ratio of African Americans to whites who were stopped ranged up to 
ten times higher than one would expect from population data.42 
Further, one-third of all pedestrian stops were made without 
sufficient written explanation.43 In November 2003, a follow-up study 
regarding stops and searches in Philadelphia showed a continuing 
pattern of racial disparities in both car and pedestrian stops.44 
 
37. Id. at 26–27. The police reporting form requires the officer to provide a 
reason for any stop, frisk, or arrest. Id. at 1–7. 
38. Id. at 28. 
39. Fifth Philadelphia Report, supra note 32, at 14. 
40. Id. at 20–25. 
41. Id. at 26–27. 
42. Id. at 22–26. 
43. Id. at 13–14. 
44. The data set forth in Appendix A is from the Philadelphia Police 
Department’s analysis of its records regarding car and pedestrian stops. See infra 
app. A at 123. Plaintiffs’ counsel reviewed the same documents and found higher 
rates of improper stops and frisks. Thus, while the Police Department found 96 
improper stops, 72 improper frisks, and 27 improper searches, plaintiffs found 
313 improper stops alone, or approximately 23% of all stops. Letter from author, 
Alan Yatvin & Jonathan Feinberg, plaintiffs’ counsel, to Carlton Johnson, Chief 
Deputy City Solicitor, Law Department, Karen Simmons, Special Counsel to the 
Commissioner & Francis Healy, Police Department (Dec. 21, 2004) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Letter from author]. 
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In 1999, the Attorney General of New York State conducted a 
study of 175,000 pedestrian stops by the New York City Police 
Department over a fifteen-month period in 1998–99 and found a 
highly disproportionate rate of stops of minorities.45 The Attorney 
General determined that (1) African Americans were stopped six 
times more frequently than whites;46 (2) in precincts with a white 
population of 80% or more and where African Americans constituted 
10% or less of the population, stops of African Americans constituted 
30% of all stops, more than ten times their percentage of the 
population;47 (3) stops of African Americans were less likely to result 
in arrests than stops of whites;48 and (4) adjusting for crime rates by 
race, the differences in stops of minorities compared to stops of 
whites was statistically significant, with African Americans stopped 
more than twice as often as whites for suspected violent crimes and 
weapons charges.49 The Attorney General also reported that where 
the police provided a full factual statement concerning the stop, 
15.4% of the stops failed to comply with Fourth Amendment 
standards.50 In addition, 23.5% of the stops failed to provide a 
sufficient factual basis, on their face, to determine whether the stop 
was constitutionally proper.51 
Recent disclosures by the New York City Police Department 
show an enormous increase in the number of pedestrian stops (and 
frisks) in the years following the Attorney General’s Report.52 
Overall, the number of stops for 2006 was up more than 500% from 
2002.53 Of those stopped, 55.2% were African-American, 30.5% were 
Hispanic, and 11.1% were white.54 
Stops and searches by U.S. customs officials also disclose 
racial bias. From 1997–98, there were approximately 102,000 people 
 
45. Civil Rights Bureau, Office of the Att’y Gen. of the State of N.Y., The 
New York City Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Practices: A Report to the 
People of the State of New York From The Office Of The Attorney General 88–89 
(Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stp_frsk.pdf. 
46. Id. at 95. 
47. Id. at 105–06. 
48. Id. at 111. 
49. Id. at 121, 127. 
50. Id. at 160–62. 
51. Id. at 162–64. 
52. Al Baker & Emily Vasquez, Police Report Far More Stops And 
Searches, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 2007, at A1. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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selected for body searches (ranging from hand frisks to strip and 
cavity searches) by customs officials.55 Almost half of all persons 
selected for these searches were African-American or Latino.56 In 
96% of all the searches, officials found no contraband.57 Further, in 
1998, African-American women were nine times more likely than 
white women to be subjected to x-rays after being frisked or patted 
down, yet on the basis of the x-ray results they were less than half as 
likely as their white counterparts to be found carrying contraband.58 
The fact that these practices with clear discriminatory effects 
are so difficult to challenge under our current constitutional 
framework reveals the distorting effects of McCleskey and 
Armstrong.59 As the following discussion will demonstrate, the 
Fourth Amendment provides virtually no protection against racially 
discriminatory stops and searches. And while the Fourteenth 
Amendment does provide a doctrinal basis for challenge, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires a showing of intentional racial 
discrimination before a court may consider legal remedies.60 In this 
framework, great care must be taken in structuring litigation that 
can successfully challenge these discriminatory practices. I first 
address the constitutional standards governing stops and searches of 
cars and pedestrians in the racial profiling context and then turn to 
the issue of remedial measures. 
A. The Fourth Amendment and Racial Profiling61 
While the Fourth Amendment places some limits on police 
power to conduct searches or seizures, as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court in Whren v. United States, these limits do not protect 
 
55. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of 
Airline Passengers for Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results 40 (2000), 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00038.pdf. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 2. 
59. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); United States v. Armstrong, 
517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
60. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–45 (1976). 
61. This section draws on an earlier article in which I addressed these 
issues. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: 
Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 296 
(2001). 
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individuals from racially discriminatory police practices.62 While the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness,” the Court 
has interpreted that standard broadly, so even stops or searches 
infected by racial bias can be reasonable.63 
1. Car Stops 
Police officers may stop a car if they have cause to believe 
that a crime has been committed, including any traffic violation.64 
Under the “automobile exception,” car stops may be made in almost 
all circumstances without a search or arrest warrant, though 
probable cause is required for any search of the car.65 Since violations 
of the traffic laws are commonplace, police have enormous discretion 
to effectuate stops of a very high number of cars. This discretion 
provides the opportunity for pretextual stops and searches. 
In Whren v. United States, Washington, D.C. police officers 
made a traffic stop and observed two bags of crack cocaine in the 
hands of a front-seat passenger.66 The police testified that they 
stopped the car because the driver had violated several traffic laws.67 
The defendants claimed that the stop was pretextual: the police were 
suspicious because they observed two African-American men in a 
Nissan Pathfinder in Southeast Washington and, lacking any cause 
for a stop to investigate drugs, decided to stop on the basis of alleged 
traffic violations so they could conduct a drug investigation.68 In fact, 
the officers involved were on a vice-detail, which prohibited them by 
departmental regulation from making routine traffic stops.69 
The Supreme Court ruled that from a Fourth Amendment 
perspective, the “constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops” does 
not depend “on the actual motivations of the individual officers.”70 
According to the Court, the only relevant question was whether, 
looking at the circumstances from an objective viewpoint, the officer 
 
62. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816–19 (1996). 
63. Id. at 811–13. 
64. Id. at 816–19. 
65. Wyoming v. Houghten, 526 U.S. 295, 309 (1999) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)). 
66. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809. 
67. Id. at 808–09. 
68. Id. at 808, 810. 
69. Id. at 815. 
70. Id. at 813. 
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had legal cause for the stop.71 The Court rejected the argument that 
the Fourth Amendment requires consideration of whether “the 
officer’s conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so 
that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have 
made the stop for the reasons given.”72 
In response to the argument that pretextual stops could be 
racially motivated, the Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment would prohibit any intentional race 
discrimination in a car stop.73 However, this perfunctory statement 
did not address the means by which an intentional race 
discrimination claim could be proven or what remedies might be 
available to either a criminal defendant or a civil litigant.74 
2. Pedestrian Stops 
The law with respect to pedestrian stops is also governed by 
the Fourth Amendment, but there are significant doctrinal and 
practical differences between the legal standards developed in this 
context and those that have developed in connection with automobile 
stops and searches. The great majority of police-pedestrian 
encounters are governed by the stop and frisk principles of Terry v. 
 
71. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810–13 (1996). 
72. Id. at 814. 
73. Id. at 813. 
74. As the author of both Whren and the dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 
Justice Scalia has noted the potential dangers of selective law enforcement, 
especially in prosecution: 
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that he 
can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous 
power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks 
he should get, rather than cases that need to be prosecuted. 
With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a 
prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical 
violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. . . . It is in 
this realm—in which the prosecutor picks some person whom 
he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of 
unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the 
greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies. 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting R. 
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Delivered at the Second Annual 
Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940)); see Paul Butler, Starr is to 
Clinton as Regular Prosecutors Are to Blacks, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 705, 709–10 (1999) 
(citing Olson). 
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Ohio.75 In Terry, the Court ruled for the first time that the seizure of 
a person by the police could be justified by less than probable cause.76 
The Court held that where a police officer has “reasonable suspicion” 
of criminal activity, she may stop the person for investigation.77 
Further, if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and 
dangerous, the officer may conduct a frisk of that suspect for the 
officer’s protection.78 Over the past forty years, the Terry doctrine has 
been expanded to permit police to seize and frisk people in a wide 
array of circumstances, even where the person’s conduct is fully 
consistent with legal activity.79 By virtue of these legal standards, the 
police are afforded enormous discretion with respect to whom they 
will subject to investigative procedures. This discretion operates on a 
number of levels, including police deployment, criminal activity 
targeted, and the numerous factors that may be considered in 
targeting possible suspects. Moreover, as in the car stop and search 
area, there is a critical intersection of police discretion and race, and 
the Fourth Amendment does not specifically protect individuals from 
racially biased policing.80 
B. The Equal Protection Remedial Framework 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
is the only other available constitutional vehicle that litigants may 
 
75. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
76. Id. at 27. 
77. Id. at 30. 
78. Id. at 24, 27, 30. 
79. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (holding that 
conduct that appears innocent may provide reasonable suspicion depending on 
the context and the “totality of the circumstances”); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 124 (2000) (finding that the suspect’s headlong flight in a high crime area, 
without any other evidence of criminal conduct, was sufficient to justify stopping 
him); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972) (stating that an unverified 
tip that the suspect possessed narcotics and a gun in a high crime area was 
sufficient to allow the officer to stop and frisk the suspect, even though possessing 
a concealed weapon was legal); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.1(a), at 272 (4th ed. 2004). 
80. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 134–35 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (suggesting that even evidence of innocence and racial 
profiling do not make a stop and search per se invalid, provided that other factors 
reasonably establish probable cause and provided that a local reviewing court 
would not expect the police officer to believe that the putative suspect was fleeing 
innocently due to fear of racial profiling, as where that fear is prevalent and 
known). 
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use to challenge racially biased stops and searches. Some litigants 
have successfully invoked equal protection principles in challenges to 
police misconduct.81 However, the strong consensus against racial 
profiling has unraveled after 9/11 and the debate has shifted, with a 
number of commentators supporting consideration of racial or ethnic 
factors in the war on terror.82 This political development complicates 
the task of challenging racial profiling in the courts. 
On the doctrinal front, while McCleskey and Armstrong close 
the door to certain challenges based on racial disparities, they are not 
necessarily dispositive of all racial profiling claims. In McCleskey, the 
Court affirmed the unique discretion given to juries to decide 
between life and death by requiring proof beyond statistical patterns 
in the system as a whole to show that the judgment in an individual 
case was infected by intentional discrimination.83 In Armstrong, the 
Court required the defendant to show that similarly situated white 
offenders were not subject to federal prosecution.84 
However, selective policing claims can survive the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in McCleskey and Armstrong. Even those courts 
that will not allow discriminatory intent to be inferred from 
disparate jury findings or disparate prosecutions based on similar 
facts will find that statistical evidence that law enforcement officers 
repeatedly target racial minorities is sufficient to establish a 
 
81. See Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1141 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) (sustaining plaintiffs' equal protection claims over summary judgment 
on grounds that law enforcement is not accorded the same presumption of 
discretion as prosecutors, that conclusive evidence of similarly situated drivers' 
disparate treatment would be difficult to obtain, and that statistical evidence of 
traffic stops was probative of discriminatory intent); Md. State Conference of 
NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep't of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560, 565 (D. Md. 
1999) (finding that statistical evidence of racially disparate traffic stops should 
have placed law enforcement superiors on notice of possibly unconstitutional 
policies); Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming a 
$245,000 award for a racially motivated arrest and use of excessive force); Hall v. 
Ochs, 817 F.2d 920, 927 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing the “profound and lasting effect” of 
racially motivated conduct in upholding the jury’s damage award). 
82. For a discussion of post-9/11 profiling issues, see Deborah Ramirez et 
al., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World, 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
1195 (2003). 
83. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 289–90 (1987) (maintaining that 
because the Constitution requires a range of discretion in a jury’s capital 
sentencing decision, some level of disparate results for the same facts must be 
constitutionally tolerable). 
84. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996). 
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Fourteenth Amendment claim. Such a claim is possible due to some 
important distinguishing points. 
First, evidence showing statistically significant disparities in 
the rates at which similarly situated black and white drivers are 
stopped and searched pursuant to alleged traffic violations can be 
sufficient to satisfy the factual predicate for selective enforcement 
demanded by Armstrong, i.e., that similarly situated white drivers 
have not been stopped and searched.85 
Second, Armstrong reaffirmed the ruling in Batson v. 
Kentucky86 that statistical proof of a discriminatory policy or purpose 
is sufficient where a challenged practice is characterized by a highly 
discretionary selection procedure that is susceptible to abuse.87 Other 
courts have acknowledged that where discrimination is sufficiently 
“clandestine and covert,” statistical evidence of a discriminatory 
pattern is the “only available avenue of proof.”88 Several lower courts 
have in fact sustained equal protection claims of racial profiling 
based on this order of proof.89 Where a racial profiling challenge is 
 
85. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985) (relying on 
statistical evidence of racial disparities in finding that a facially neutral 
disenfranchisement statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
86. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). 
87. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 467–68. 
88. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977) 
(quoting United States v. Ironworkers Local 86 443 F.2d 544, 551 (1971)). As the 
Court stated in International Brotherhood: 
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a 
case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a 
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, 
it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring 
practices will in time result in a work force more or less 
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the 
population in the community from which employees are hired. 
Id.; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494–95 (1977) (stating that a 
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose by using 
statistics to show substantial underrepresentation of his group). 
89. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1141 
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (sustaining plaintiffs’ equal protection claims over summary 
judgment on grounds that law enforcement is not accorded the same presumption 
of regularity and non-arbitrary discretion as prosecutors, that conclusive evidence 
of similarly situated drivers’ disparate treatment would be difficult to obtain, and 
that statistical evidence of traffic stops was probative of discriminatory intent); 
Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 560, 565 (D. Md. 1999) (finding that statistical evidence of racially 
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based on the theory that law enforcement’s official policy applies an 
express racial classification, there should be no need to plead or 
prove the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group or 
person who was not subject to the complained of practices.90 As the 
Second Circuit recently explained: 
[I]t is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly 
situated non-minority group when challenging a law or 
policy that contains an express, racial classification. These 
classifications are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, see Albe 
v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 631–32 (2d Cir. 1998), and 
strict scrutiny analysis in effect addresses the question of 
whether people of different races are similarly situated 
with regard to the law or policy at issue.91 
Third, Armstrong was a selective prosecution case 
challenging a prosecutor’s discretion in deciding to charge particular 
defendants.92 Prosecutors are accorded a strong presumption in favor 
of the “regularity” of their decisions, rebuttable only by “clear 
evidence to the contrary.”93 Because of separation of powers concerns, 
“courts are ‘properly hesitant to examine the decisions whether to 
prosecute.’”94 However, police officers charged with racial 
discrimination or other violations of constitutional norms in law 
enforcement duties are not accorded the same presumption of 
correctness.95 
 
disparate traffic stops should have placed law enforcement superiors on notice of 
possibly unconstitutional policies); Nat’l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of 
New York, 191 F.R.D. 52, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that the allegation of a de 
facto policy of racial profiling supported by some statistical evidence was 
sufficient to claim an express discriminatory policy that would survive summary 
judgment). 
90. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000); Nat’l Cong. 
for Puerto Rican Rights, 191 F.R.D. at 54. 
91. Brown, 221 F.3d at 337. 
92. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463. 
93. Id. at 464. 
94. Id. at 465 (quoting United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1995)). 
95. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) (voiding as vague 
a city ordinance that allowed police to disperse loitering “criminal street gang 
members” from public places, partly on the ground that the ordinance encouraged 
discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 
358 (1983) (finding a loitering statute void because it “vests virtually complete 
discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has 
satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of 
probable cause to arrest”); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 813–14 (1974) 
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Moreover, damage actions based on racial profiling and equal 
protection principles can in some circumstances deter 
unconstitutional practices and compensate individual victims of 
misconduct where no remedy exists in a criminal case. While the 
usual remedy for discriminatory practices in the context of criminal 
prosecutions is suppression of evidence,96 the Supreme Court has 
never recognized an exclusionary rule permitting such suppression of 
evidence in cases alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations.97 
Further, discovery in criminal cases is generally far more restricted 
than in civil litigation, and where drugs are found, trial judges 
usually find some way to avoid suppressing evidence.98 Accordingly, 
civil litigation is more likely to provide systemic relief than defense of 
individual criminal cases.99 Moreover, counsel should consider ways 
in which this remedy can be enhanced, for example through class 
actions or joinder of claims. Where large damage awards or 
settlements are obtained, civil actions may cause police 
administrators to reform their department and to change the 
impermissible practices. 
Civil litigants may also seek federal injunctive relief against 
state or local officers upon a showing of a violation of federal 
constitutional or statutory rights. This remedy is potentially the most 
 
(affirming an injunction prohibiting police from “using their authority as peace 
officers to arrest, stop, disperse or imprison [labor organizers] . . . without 
‘adequate cause’” on the ground that the injunction only limited law 
enforcement’s discretion so that it would not exceed constitutional bounds). 
96. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (applying the exclusionary 
rule to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). But 
see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (refusing to apply the 
exclusionary rule where the officer relied in good faith on a warrant later found to 
be invalid). 
97. See Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some 
Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 559, 
571 (1998). 
98. Alan M. Dershowitz, Controlling the Cops: Accomplices to Perjury, N.Y. 
Times, May 2, 1994, at A17; Christopher Slobogin, Testifying: Police Perjury and 
What to do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037, 1047 (1996). 
99. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). This case 
broke open the practice of racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike and is an 
example of a successful use of the criminal defense process. There, liberal 
discovery rules, consolidation of several cases from the Turnpike, and use of 
experts led to a significant release of a police agency’s documentation and 
suppression orders for evidence seized during discriminatory traffic stops, based 
on state constitutional law. 
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effective and far-reaching remedial mechanism for preventing future 
violations of rights. The injunctive action is not encumbered by the 
officers’ ministerial immunities, since they are immune only as 
agents of the state rather than in their personal capacities, and the 
Eleventh Amendment, which confers sovereign immunity on states, 
is avoided under the Ex Parte Young doctrine.100 
However, the federal courts’ equitable powers are 
circumscribed by federalism, comity, and standing doctrine, which 
may limit the effectiveness of civil litigation in combating racial 
profiling. To have standing to establish a claim for equitable relief, a 
plaintiff first must show a likelihood of future injury.101 In City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, the plaintiff was stopped by Los Angeles police 
officers for a traffic violation and placed in a chokehold causing 
damage to his larynx.102 The Supreme Court denied Lyons’ request 
for an injunction, ruling that he had not made out a case or 
controversy based on a sufficient likelihood that he would again be 
subjected to a police chokehold. The Court stated: 
In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, 
Lyons would have had not only to allege that he would have 
another encounter with the police but also to make the 
incredible assertion either, (1) that all police officers in Los 
Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen 
to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, 
issuing a citation, or for questioning, or, (2) that the City 
ordered or authorized police officers to act in such 
manner.103 
The second ground for standing is that the conduct sought to 
be enjoined is officially authorized.104 This element may be 
established more easily in racial profiling cases where a pattern and 
 
100. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) (permitting suit against 
state officials in their individual capacities on the theory that they do not act on 
behalf of the state when they act in an unconstitutional manner). See also Hafer 
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (holding that an act performed under color of law 
or in some official capacity is not accorded sovereign immunity from liability 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if the act was an abuse of the official’s position that 
deprived some person of her constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities). 
101. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (concluding that past 
exposure to illegal conduct does not satisfy the case and controversy requirement 
for injunctive relief if unaccompanied by continuing adverse effects). 
102. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97–98 (1983). 
103. Id. at 105–06. 
104. Id. at 106. 
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practice of illegal stops of large numbers of persons is proven.105 
Where the police officers’ conduct is the product of official policy or 
practice, it is far more likely that they will repeat such conduct. In 
addition, it increases the likelihood that a plaintiff who engages in 
activities that bring him into the purview of this conduct will suffer 
future injury, thereby satisfying Lyons. Therefore, the existence of a 
policy that will directly affect the plaintiff or members of the 
plaintiff’s class may be sufficient to establish standing.106 
The Supreme Court distinguished Lyons in Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,107 where it granted Article 
III standing to plaintiffs in an environmental lawsuit challenging the 
pollution of a river. The plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered 
“injury in fact,” because the pollution deterred them from using the 
river for recreational purposes.108 The Court ruled in Friends of the 
Earth that there was “nothing ‘improbable’ about the proposition 
that a company’s continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of 
pollutants into a river would cause nearby residents to curtail their 
recreational use of that waterway and would subject them to other 
 
105. See id., 461 U.S. at 113–37 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(combining statistical evidence of disparate impact with official statements of a 
policy of broad police discretion to infer an official policy of discrimination); Allee 
v. Medrano, 416 US. 802, 815 (1974) (holding that where there is a pattern of 
police misconduct in suppressing organized labor activities, injunctive relief is 
appropriate). 
106. See, e.g., Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
the police interrogation practices are subject to equitable relief, yet dismissing 
the claim based on failure of proof); Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 
92 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the fourteen named plaintiffs had 
standing to obtain statewide injunctive relief against the state police where 
illegal citation practices were the result of official practice and policy); Thomas v. 
County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiffs had 
standing where “numerous instances of police misconduct have occurred in a 
small six by seven block area, [and] some minority residents of the area have 
been mistreated by deputies more than once”); Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 
89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1135–36 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that NAACP and LULAC 
had standing in a racial profiling suit); Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches 
v. Md. Dep’t of State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560, 565 (D. Md. 1999) (finding that a 
minority motorist’s showing of a pattern of racially discriminatory stops, 
detentions, and searches by Maryland state police, along with allegations of past 
injury and likely future travel on the same highway, was sufficient to satisfy a 
risk-of-injury requirement for standing). 
107. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 
167, 184 (2000). 
108. Id. at 168. 
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economic and aesthetic harms.”109 Under this standard, Lyons did not 
bar the action since the unlawful conduct was occurring at the time 
the complaint was filed. If a polluted river can affect everyone using 
that water source, racial profiling on highways is equally offensive as 
it randomly affects thousands of drivers. 
Beyond the “official policy” argument, there are several 
grounds for distinguishing Lyons. First, the Court stressed that the 
past encounter would repeat itself only if Lyons again violated the 
law.110 In racial profiling cases, where the stop is based on an 
immutable characteristic and the plaintiff has not engaged in 
unlawful activity, there is a greater likelihood that the misconduct 
will affect the targeted class and these factors may be sufficient to 
provide standing.111 
Second, Lyons was subjected to the chokehold on only one 
occasion and the record in the case demonstrated that this type of 
force, while serious and at times deadly, was infrequently employed 
by the Department.112 By contrast, racial profiling plaintiffs may 
have been subjected to numerous stops.113 
There have been a number of successful civil rights 
challenges to racial profiling practices. For example, in June 1999, 
litigants, represented by the ACLU of Northern California, filed a 
class action lawsuit against the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”), 
which ultimately resulted in a temporary moratorium on consent 
 
109. Id. at 184. See also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gatson Copper 
Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156–61 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that the 
plaintiff had standing where his use of the waterway was reduced by the 
defendant’s actions). 
110. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102–03. 
111. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cornejo, 199 F.R.D. 228, 244 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
2000) (holding that a class of African-American women strip-searched at O’Hare 
Airport by customs agents could be certified for the purpose of injunctive relief); 
Nat’l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 191 F.R.D. 52, 55 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the allegation that police stopped and frisked black 
and Latino men without reasonable suspicion based on their race was sufficient 
to state an equal protection claim, even though the complaint failed to identify 
similarly situated individuals who were not stopped). 
112. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108–09. 
113. In Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(en banc) the court ruled that two individuals who had each been stopped once 
over a several-year period and who regularly drove in the area in which they 
claimed illegal “border” stops were being made, lacked standing to challenge the 
actions of the Border Patrol. 
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searches conducted by the CHP.114 The plaintiffs argued that CHP 
troopers, consistent with Operation Pipeline training, were 
determining in a racially discriminatory manner who to stop, detain, 
interrogate, and/or search.115 CHP’s statistical data showed that 
between 80% and 90% of all motorists arrested by Pipeline units 
were members of minority groups, despite the fact that studies of 
Operation Pipeline programs in other states reveal that people of 
color are not more likely than whites to be carrying drugs in their 
cars.116 Approximately one year later, after data obtained during 
discovery showed that Latinos were three times more likely than 
whites to be searched, and African Americans were twice as likely as 
whites to be searched in the Central and Coastal CHP Divisions, the 
CHP Commissioner issued a moratorium on consent searches.117 In 
February 2003, the parties reached a settlement whereby the CHP 
paid $875,000 to the plaintiffs, and the CHP agreed to extend the 
moratorium on consent searches until 2006.118 The Agreement also 
requires that the CHP continue to collect data on traffic stops and 
that it create an auditor position within the CHP to review such 
data.119 
Federal injunctive relief is also available under The Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 which authorizes 
 
114. See Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
115. Id. at 1143. 
116. Fifth Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 
Injunctive Relief & Damages at para. 40, Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. 
Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-20895-JF/EAI). 
117. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Northern Cal., Rodriguez v. CHP, Feb. 
23, 2003, http://www.aclunc.org/cases/landmark_cases/rodriguez_v.shtml. 
118. Terms & Conditions of Settlement Agreement at 11, Rodriguez v. Cal. 
Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N. D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-20895-JF/HRL). 
119. Id. at 7–9. There have also been significant damage awards in other 
racial profiling cases. See, e.g., Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(affirming an award of $240,000 for a racially motivated arrest and use of force); 
Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding to the trial court 
to review for excessiveness an award of $450,000 in punitive damages, and 
affirming appellate review of damages under abuse of discretion or “grossly 
disproportionate” standard); Whitfield v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 837 F. Supp. 
338 (D. Colo. 1993) (affirming a settlement for class damages of $800,000 for 
highway racial profiling); Hall v. Ochs, 817 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming a 
$435,000 award for racially motivated misconduct); Washington v. Lambert, 98 
F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming a $10,000 award for each plaintiff plus costs 
and attorney fees). 
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the United States, through the Attorney General, to bring civil 
actions for declaratory or equitable relief against police departments 
engaged in a pattern or practice of deprivation of constitutional or 
statutory rights.120 The statute provides potentially broad grounds for 
intervention and relief, but practical political realities have seriously 
limited the law’s potential reach.121 From 1994–2000, the U.S. 
Department of Justice took legal action against a number of state 
and local law enforcement agencies.122 But during the Bush 
Administration, almost all efforts have ended. 
A number of state courts, applying state constitutional 
principles, have been more amenable to providing remedies for 
racially disparate practices. Both criminal and civil litigation in these 
jurisdictions have yielded results not possible in federal court: some 
state courts have found pretextual arrests to be unconstitutional 
under state law;123 the New Jersey Supreme Court has required a 
showing of reasonable suspicion before an officer may seek consent to 
search a car;124 Pennsylvania has rejected the United States Supreme 
Court’s decisions permitting broad searches of cars without 
warrants;125 and state courts have suppressed evidence seized as a 
 
120. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1995). For a discussion of the implementation of 
the Act by the Department of Justice, see Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing 
Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of 
Civil Rights, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1384 (2000); Debra Livingston, Police Reform 
and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 
815 (1999). 
121. Livingston, supra note 120, at 841–50. 
122. Id. at 815–16. 
123. See, e.g., State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999) (holding 
pretextual traffic stops illegal under the state constitution); State v. Sullivan, 74 
S.W.3d 215 (Ark. 2002) (holding pretextual arrests unconstitutional). But see 
State v. Harmon, 113 S.W.3d 75 (Ark. 2003) (holding that pretextual stops are 
legitimate). 
124. See State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 905 (N.J. 2002). 
125. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1996) (affirming 
suppression of evidence retrieved during a warrantless automobile search. The 
court found the warrantless automobile search was not permissible under 
“automobile exception,” nor was it justifiable as an inventory search or incident to 
arrest); Commonwealth v. Timko, 417 A.2d 620 (Pa. 1980) (holding 
Commonwealth failed to establish search of zippered valise without a warrant 
was incident to defendant’s arrest. Since the valise could not be searched without 
a warrant simply because it was found in an automobile, nor was it justifiable as 
an inventory search); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2000) 
(holding searches invalid if driver consented while illegally detained); 
Commonwealth v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176 (Pa. 2000) (holding that suppression of 
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result of racial profiling.126 Unfortunately, even success on individual 
criminal cases, by suppression or otherwise, is not likely to have a 
lasting impact on racially biased practices. 
III. LESSONS FROM THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT 
Over the last fifteen years, we have witnessed the 
exoneration of over 200 persons based on DNA and other post-trial 
proof of innocence.127 Many of these exonerations have been the 
result of work by the Innocence Project, a public interest organization 
affiliated with the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva 
University, and the Innocence Network, a group of law schools, 
journalism schools, and public defender offices, whose shared mission 
is to help inmates prove their innocence and to work with 
researchers and lawmakers to reform the criminal justice system to 
prevent future wrongful convictions.128 These exonerations provide a 
critical window into the fault lines of the criminal justice system, 
including unreliable eyewitness identifications, police and 
prosecutorial misconduct, false or coerced confessions, faulty forensic 
practices and evidence, racial bias, and ineffective defense counsel.129 
A recent in-depth study of these DNA exonerations found that 
disproportionate numbers of those convicted and later found to be 
 
evidence was proper where search of the vehicle was illegal on account of illegal 
detention of driver since consent was requested after the driver was told he was 
free to go). 
126. See, e.g., State v. Donahue, 742 A.2d 775, 782 (Conn. 1999) (discussing 
the “insidious specter of ‘profiling’”); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1996) (equal protection and due process are violated where there is 
evidence that blacks are targeted for investigation and arrest, indicating selective 
enforcement of traffic laws); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108, 115–
16 (Mass. 1999) (Ireland, J., concurring) (finding that police may not order people 
out of their cars without justification, such as reasonable belief that officer’s 
safety, or safety of others, is in danger). 
127. The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission 
-Statement.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2007); The Innocence Project, 200 
Exonerated: Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Images/751/ip_200.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2007) (providing details of the first 200 
people the Innocence Project helped to exonerate using DNA evidence). 
128. The Innocence Project, About the Innocence Project, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2007). 
129. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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factually innocent of the charges were racial minorities.130 In some 
areas, such as cross-racial eyewitness identifications, there is strong 
evidence of direct racial bias.131 
Given the substantial racially disparate impact of virtually 
all aspects of the criminal justice system, corrective measures on any 
front will help to reduce the pernicious effects of racial bias. In some 
jurisdictions, reform movements have seized upon these findings to 
work changes in these problematic areas.132 A leading example is the 
Illinois Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment, which made 
specific recommendations regarding video-taping of police 
interrogations, procedures for photospreads and other eyewitness 
identification processes, use of jailhouse informants, and disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence to defendants.133 A number of jurisdictions have 
made changes in identification and interrogation practices, and 
 
130. Id. (manuscript at 9, on file with The Columbia Law Review). 
131. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 804 N.E.2d 336, 344 (Mass. 
2004) (Cordy, J., concurring) (the unreliability of cross-racial identification is a 
subject “beyond the ordinary experience and knowledge of the average juror” 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Middleton, 378 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. 1978)); State v. 
Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112, 128 (1999) (requiring jury instruction on possible 
unreliability of cross-racial identifications); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, 
Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277 (2003) (reviewing developments 
in experimental literature regarding how various factors relate to the accuracy of 
eyewitness identifications). 
132. See Barry Scheck et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and 
Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted (2000); Am. Bar Ass’n Crim. 
Justice Section Ad Hoc Innocence Comm. to Ensure the Integrity of the Crim. 
Process, Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent and Convicting the Guilty 
(2006); Innocence Comm’n for Virginia, A Vision for Justice: Report and 
Recommendations Regarding Wrongful Convictions in the Commonwealth of 
Virginia (2005); Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice, Official 
Recommendations to Improve Eyewitness Identifications (2006), available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/eyewitness/official/eyewitnessidrep.pdf; 
Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Justice, Report and Recommendations 
regarding Informant Testimony (2006), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/ 
documents/reports/jailhouse/official/Official%20Report.pdf; Cal. Comm’n on the 
Fair Admin. of Justice, Report and Recommendations regarding False 
Confessions (2006), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/false/ 
official/falconfrep.pdf. 
133. State of Ill. Comm’n on Capital Punishment, Report of the Governor’s 
Commission on Capital Punishment 19–22 (2002), available at http://www.idoc. 
state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/summary_recommendations.pdf. 
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others have started to reform their criminal defense services and 
their forensic laboratories and protocols.134 
From a litigation perspective, the insights that have been 
gained as a result of the numerous exonerations and related studies 
on how criminal justice has failed can be used to support arguments 
for changes in the constitutional standards for identification 
procedures, disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and effectiveness of 
defense counsel.135 The time is ripe to re-conceptualize the 
functioning of the criminal justice system, and eliminating the 
insidious influence of race should be high on the reform list. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Twenty years after the Supreme Court’s unfortunate decision 
in McCleskey v. Kemp, the struggle to redress racial discrimination in 
the criminal justice system continues in the courts and other venues. 
While some litigation challenges have been effectively precluded by 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to provide adequate remedies or 
procedures to challenge race discrimination, litigation that focuses on 
police practices has provided some systemic relief. In this article, I 
have focused on the most effective remedies and the types of cases 
that can be brought to achieve racial equality. 
The Supreme Court recently ruled that consideration of race 
in a city’s attempt to integrate its public schools violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.136 The Court held 
that the school districts failed to show a compelling state interest in 
such practices and failed to show that their programs were narrowly 
tailored to promote diversity and avoid racial isolation.137 There is 
much to be said for Justice Breyer’s dissent in the case, in which he 
accuses the Court of turning its back on Brown v. Board of 
 
134. See Jules Epstein, Tri-State Vagaries: The Varying Responses of 
Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania to the Phenomenon of Mistaken 
Identifications, 12 Widener L. Rev. 327 (2006) (examining various state responses 
to the problem of unreliable eyewitness identification and the extent to which 
these jurisdictions have acknowledged scientific findings regarding perception, 
memory, and recall). 
135. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal 
Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 35, 103–06 (2005). 
136. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2767–68 (2007). 
137. Id. at 2749. 
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Education.138 Nevertheless, whatever the merits of that debate, if a 
state must be colorblind with respect to school placements, and 
integration is not a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify the 
use of race, it is difficult indeed to see how racial profiling in law 
enforcement can serve any legitimate state interest. Of course, 
without significant litigation efforts, police reform, and judicial 
willingness to hear claims of racial profiling, these practices will 
continue to stain our constitutional fabric. 
 
138. Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954)). 
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V. APPENDIX A 
Table 1  Car and Pedestrian Stops in Philadelphia in 2003139 
Activity African-
American 
Latino White 
Total Car stops140 2155 (47.6% of all 
stops) 
545 (12.0% of 
all stops) 
1600 (35.3% of 
all stops) 
Car stops without 
reasonable 
suspicion141 
58.8% (0.9% within 
racial category) 
14.7% (0.9% 
within racial 
category) 
23.5% (0.5% 
within racial 
category) 
Car stops with 
frisks of driver or 
passenger 
60% (7.2% within 
racial category) 
13% (6.2% 
within racial 
category) 
25% (4.1% 
within racial 
category) 
Total pedestrian 
stops 
873 (64.9% of all 
stops) 
118 (8.8% of 
all stops) 
322 (23.9% of all 
stops) 
Pedestrian stops 
without reasonable 
suspicion 
72 (75% of all stops) 9 (9.4% of all 
stops) 
11 (11.5% of all 
stops) 
Pedestrian stops 
with frisks 
351 (75.8% of all 
stops) 
42 (9.1% of all 
stops) 
62 (13.4% of all 
stops) 
Pedestrian frisks 
without reasonable 
suspicion 
58 (80.6% of all 
stops) 
6 (8.3% of all 
stops) 
8 (11.1% of all 
stops) 
Pedestrian 
stops with searches 
135 (73.0% of all 
stops) 
12 (6.5% of all 
stops) 
35 (18.9% of all 
stops) 
Pedestrian searches 
without cause 
21 (77.8% of all 
stops) 
2 (7.4% of all 
stops) 
4 (14.8% of all 
stops) 
 
 
139. See Letter from author, supra note 44. The population of Philadelphia 
as of the 2000 census was approximately 45% white, 43% African-American, and 
8% Latino. U.S. Census Bureau, Philadelphia County, PA Quick Facts, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/42101.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007). 
140. The data show that minorities were stopped at almost a two-to-one 
ratio compared to white drivers, while the actual minority driving population in 
Philadelphia is roughly 50%, and there is no evidence of higher rates of moving 
violations or other traffic violations by minority drivers. Fifth Philadelphia 
Report, supra note 32, at 17. 
141. The data show that close to 75% of all stops made without reasonable 
suspicion were of minorities. 
